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THE 1921 HEADLINE TRIAL, ALABAMA v. EDWIN R. 
STEPHENSON—SEEING OURSELVES IN A GRAIN OF SAND 
SHARON L. DAVIES* 
INTRODUCTION 
I was very pleased to learn that Professor Lawrence Friedman would focus 
on the nature and significance of headline criminal trials in this year’s 
Childress lecture.  Having recently published a book recounting one such trial 
myself—the 1921 trial of Methodist minister, Reverend Edwin R. Stephenson, 
for the murder of a Catholic priest, Father James E. Coyle, in Birmingham, 
Alabama1—I was interested in whether that once nationally-known trial 
undercut or bolstered Professor Friedman’s template.2  As discussed below, 
several of the attributes that Professor Friedman tells us headline trials possess 
are in fact noticeable in Alabama v. Edwin Stephenson.  Though a national 
sensation at the time, memory of the 1921 trial of Reverend Edwin Stephenson 
gradually faded after the jury rendered its verdict, along with the multiplicity 
of lessons it had to offer.  I decided to write Rising Road: A True Tale of Love, 
Race, and Religion in America partly to resurrect this forgotten chapter in our 
nation’s history. 
In this Article, my objectives are more modest.  They are two-fold.  First, I 
hope to use the historically compelling facts of the 1921 prosecution of 
Reverend Stephenson to interrogate the list of features Professor Friedman 
proffers as being common to headline trials.  This examination confirms the 
validity of Professor Friedman’s typology.  In addition, Professor Friedman’s 
lecture inspired me to think a bit deeper about the enduring significance of 
headline trials, in particular about how the legal strategies employed in such 
high profile trials reveal the strength of our former fears and social 
commitments.  Thus, Part Three considers the “honor defense,” a legal 
stratagem on open display in Alabama v. Edwin R. Stephenson. 
 
* John C. Elam/Vorys Sater Designated Professor of Law at The Ohio State University, Moritz 
College of Law. 
 1. SHARON L. DAVIES, RISING ROAD: A TRUE TALE OF LOVE, RACE, AND RELIGION IN 
AMERICA (2010). 
 2. Lawrence M. Friedman, Front Page: Notes on the Nature and Significance of Headline 
Trials, 55 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1243 (2011). 
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I.  PROFESSOR FRIEDMAN’S “FRONT PAGE: NOTES ON THE NATURE AND 
SIGNIFICANCE OF HEADLINE TRIALS” 
Professor Friedman began this year’s Childress Lecture by examining the 
nature of trials themselves.3  There are a variety of ways to conceive trials, he 
told us, but every trial can be reduced to a type of “stage play.”4  Human 
dramas put on public display, as to which lawyers offer competing narratives 
to a judge or jury, who then appraise the likelihood of those narratives against 
some well-defined legal standard.  Famously, in criminal trials, that standard 
requires of the prosecution proof “beyond a reasonable doubt.”5 
Professor Friedman then narrowed his focus to consider the subset of 
criminal trials that for one reason or another become “headline” trials, in 
contrast to the more numerous cases crowding courthouse dockets that remain 
anonymous, failing to attract widespread, or even any, public attention.6  To 
help us understand why only a sliver of trials take on celebrity status, Professor 
Friedman creates a rough typology of “headline trials,” then offers some 
thoughts about the broader social significance these trials possess.7  Headline 
trials achieve their lofty status, Friedman says, because they involve either 
persons or criminal acts thought to be particularly newsworthy.8  Moreover, 
these “showy” affairs almost always serve some important social function 
beyond the mere determination of the guilt or innocence of the criminally 
accused, typically delivering some moral lesson about crime, the consequences 
of crime, or important social norms or values.  In the words of one recent rap 
star: trials “so major, they should front page ya.”9 
Employing Professor Friedman’s system of classifications, we can think of 
headline trials then as falling into one (or often more than one) of the following 
groupings: 
Political trials: Broadly, judicial contests with “political overtones.”10  
Most famously this category would include the prosecutions of Aaron Burr for 
treason; the homicide trials of the co-conspirators responsible for Abraham 
Lincoln’s death; the espionage trials of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg; the 
 
 3. Lawrence M. Friedman, Keynote Address at the Saint Louis University School of Law 
Richard J. Childress Memorial Lecture: Front Page: Notes on the Nature and Significance of 
Headline Trials (Sept. 24, 2010). 
 4. Id.; see also Friedman, supra note 2, at 1243. 
 5. Friedman, supra note 2, at 1281. 
 6. Friedman, supra note 3. 
 7. See generally id. 
 8. See Friedman, supra note 2, at 1245 (noting that headline trials have a “sensational 
character” that “fascinate[s] the public”). 
 9. FABOLOUS, Make Me Better, on FROM NOTHIN’ TO SOMETHIN’ (The Island Def Jam 
Music Group 2007). 
 10. Friedman, supra note 2, at 1249. 
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prosecution of the anarchists, Sacco and Vanzetti, etc.11  Even more broadly, 
Friedman says, this category could be expanded to include cases involving 
important questions of public policy as well, such as the famous so-called 
“monkey trial”—the contest over barring the teaching of Darwinian evolution 
in the public schools—or the Nuremburg trials, bringing to justice prominent 
Nazi leaders after WWII.12 
Trials about Corruption or Fraud: Classic examples of the type of trial 
that would fall within this category might include the impeachment of high 
profile public figures, or the prosecution of an elite private individual who has 
in some way violated the public trust (e.g., the impeachment of President 
William Clinton; the prosecution of Bernard Madoff).13 
“Was Justice Done” Trials?: Trials that achieve headline status due to 
doubts about their impartiality or political motivation, or due to concerns about 
the way a trial was conducted, the way a conviction was accomplished or 
foiled, or the proportionality of a sentence imposed after trial (e.g., the fairness 
of the Scottsboro trial; the success of the insanity plea of John Hinckley, Jr.; 
the commuted conviction, then lynching, of Leo Frank; the slight sentence 
given to the killer of San Francisco’s Mayor George Moscone and Harvey 
Milk).14  Professor Friedman also includes in this category trials utilizing 
questionable appeals to racial or other social bigotry, such as the Hawaiian 
trials of Massie-Fortescue.15 
Tabloid Trials: This category includes trials that “titillate the public,” 
usually due to the horrific, lurid, or otherwise unexpected nature of the alleged 
criminal act (e.g., serial killer Jeffrey Dahmer’s mutilation of his victims).16 
Celebrity Trials: Trials that attract headline coverage due to the fame of 
the victim (e.g., the killing of heiress Sharon Tate by Charles Manson and his 
followers; the kidnapping and murder of the Lindbergh baby) or the fame of 
the defendant (for example, former NFL star and movie celebrity, O.J. 
Simpson).17  Professor Friedman might have included the sexual misconduct 
prosecutions of pop star Michael Jackson and NBA phenomenon, Kobe 
Bryant, as well. 
“Whodunit” Trials: Trials that intrigue the public due to some substantial 
concern over whether the prosecution has targeted the right person.18  
Friedman asks us to consider whether Lizzie Borden really killed her parents 
 
 11. Id. at 1249–51. 
 12. Id. at 1251–52. 
 13. Id. at 1252–53. 
 14. Id. at 1253–55. 
 15. Friedman, supra note 2, at 1255. 
 16. Id. at 1256–57. 
 17. Id. at 1257–60. 
 18. Id. at 1260. 
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with that axe?19  Did Dr. Sam Sheppard or some home intruder kill Sheppard’s 
wife?20  Did Claus von Bulow put his wife Sunny into a toxin-induced coma?21 
Soap Opera Trials: Love springs eternal, Friedman says.22  These trials 
arise out of some “love-triangle” or other romantic entanglement or 
motivation.23 
“Worm in the Bud” Trials: Trials that “expose the sleazy underside of 
prominent or respectable society.”24  One example Friedman offers is the 
murder trial of the privileged youths, Leopold and Loeb.25  After providing this 
schema, Professor Friedman reflects on the social and historical meaning that 
headline trials possess.  Headline trials have power to do far more than simply 
highlight the depravity of a criminal act or to acknowledge the fame of the 
parties involved, he says.  They are able to convey information (and 
misinformation) to the public, and to legitimate deeply entrenched social 
commitments (written or unwritten).  In short, headline trials are important not 
simply for their entertainment value, they are important because they teach us 
things about ourselves, reflecting, even molding future social attitudes and 
human behavior.26 
II.  ALABAMA V. EDWIN R. STEPHENSON—A TWENTIETH CENTURY EXAMPLE OF 
A “HEADLINE TRIAL” 
In this part, I apply Friedman’s descriptive categories to a case he did not 
discuss in his lecture: the 1921 killing of Father James Coyle in Birmingham, 
Alabama, and the trial of his killer, Reverend Edwin Stephenson.  A brief 
description of the facts of that case follows below. 
A. A Brief Description of the Facts 
On August 11, 1921, eighteen-year-old Ruth Stephenson, daughter of 
Reverend Edwin and Mary Stephenson, slipped away from her job at a popular 
department store in downtown Birmingham, Alabama, and met up with her 
secretly betrothed, a man named Pedro Gussman.27  Unlike Ruth Stephenson 
who had been raised in the Methodist faith, Gussman was a practicing Catholic 
and migrant from Puerto Rico.28  Just two months earlier, Ruth Stephenson had 
 
 19. Id. at 1260. 
 20. Friedman, supra note 2, at 1260–61. 
 21. Id. at 1261. 
 22. Id. at 1263. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 1264. 
 25. Friedman, supra note 2, at 1264–65. 
 26. Id. at 1281–83. 
 27. DAVIES, supra note 1, at 99. 
 28. Id. at 145, 183. 
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converted to Catholicism against her parents’ wishes and had been feuding 
with them over that decision ever since.29  Firm Protestants and intensely anti-
Catholic, Reverend Stephenson and his wife were convinced that Father James 
E. Coyle, the presiding priest of Birmingham’s largest Catholic congregation, 
had succeeded in seducing their daughter away from the Protestant faith.30 
On the day Ruth Stephenson and Pedro Gussman eloped, no law in 
Alabama prevented their union.31  Thus, the couple secured a marriage license 
without difficulty and found their way to St. Paul’s Catholic Church, where 
they asked Father James E. Coyle to perform their marriage rites.32  Tragically, 
about an hour after Father Coyle took their vows, Reverend Stephenson arrived 
at their priest’s doorstep with a loaded gun and fired three shots.33  One of his 
bullets pierced Coyle’s skull, quickly causing his death.34 
In the days following the shooting, as several eye witnesses came forward 
to tell the veteran prosecutor, Joseph Tate, what they saw and heard, the local 
chapter of the Ku Klux Klan circled its wagons around Reverend Stephenson.35  
Stephenson had joined the Klan years earlier, at a time when the white-sheeted 
Empire was enjoying an unprecedented surge in popularity.36  During this 
period the Klan had initiated a highly successful rebranding campaign that 
touted itself as a sorely-needed fraternity of “patriots,” men who bound 
themselves to each other to protect their country against the threats they 
believed Blacks, Catholics, Jews, and other immigrants posed to it.37  With this 
refurbished and expanded self-image, the Klan attracted into its ranks “the best 
men in town:” doctors, lawyers, judges, law enforcement officers, and men of 
the Protestant ministry like Reverend Edwin Stephenson.38  As Joe Tate 
struggled to convince a local grand jury to indict the minister for first degree 
murder, the Ku Klux Klan ran enormously successful fundraising drives across 
the state of Alabama to pay for Stephenson’s defense.39  The Klan then hired 
Stephenson’s team of lawyers, led by a young Hugo Black, who would later in 
his life be elected to the U.S. Senate and appointed to the United States 
Supreme Court.40 
 
 29. Id. at 96. 
 30. See id. at 16–17. 
 31. Id. at 7. 
 32. DAVIES, supra note 1, at 99–101. 
 33. Id. at 102, 219. 
 34. Id. at 72. 
 35. See id. at 110, 140. 
 36. Id. at 13. 
 37. DAVIES, supra note 1, at 13. 
 38. Sharon Davies, Op-Ed., When Catholics Were the Enemy, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2010, at 
A32; see also DAVIES, supra note 1, at 22. 
 39. DAVIES, supra note 1, at 140. 
 40. Id. at 129, 131. 
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In October 1921, droves of reporters from inside and outside Alabama 
flooded the city of Birmingham and crowded the hallways and courtroom of 
the old Jefferson County Courthouse where Stephenson’s trial was to be held, 
while America waited to see if a southern jury, quite possibly corrupted by the 
same intense anti-Catholic prejudice as Reverend Edwin Stephenson, would 
convict or acquit the minister Klansman.41 
B. Applying Friedman’s Observations Regarding the Nature of Headline 
Trials 
With this brief description of the facts that surrounded the killing of Father 
James Coyle, it is possible to consider whether Professor Friedman’s 
observations about the qualities that are likely to move a criminal trial from the 
realm of anonymity into public prominence help explain why the plight of 
Reverend Edwin R. Stephenson captured the nation’s attention back in 1921.  
They do. 
C. Applying Friedman’s Observations about the Social and Historical 
Significance of Headline Trials 
As discussed below, no less than five of Professor Friedman’s eight 
categories suggest an answer to why almost overnight Alabama v. Stephenson 
catapulted into the public eye: Soap Opera Trials; “Worm in the Bud” Trials; 
Tabloid Trials; Political Trials; and “Was Justice Done?” Trials.  Beginning 
with the first of these, the prosecution of Edwin Stephenson could readily be 
described as a “Soap Opera” trial.  As soon as it was revealed that a Methodist 
minister had been motivated to shoot a Catholic priest over the marriage of the 
minister’s daughter to a Catholic Puerto Rican, interest in the case became 
nearly insatiable.  Committed at a time when print media supplied the nation 
its daily news, reporters followed the couple’s every move.  Tellingly, the 
papers examined not only the facts immediately surrounding and explaining 
the shooting, but several other facts important to the public as well, including 
the latest fashions worn by the eighteen-year-old bride, and the troubling 
“swarthiness” of Pedro Gussman’s tanned complexion.42  By itself, 
Birmingham boasted three major papers at the time (Birmingham Age-Herald, 
Birmingham News, and Birmingham Post), and city reporters, on constant 
lookout for Pedro Gussman and his young bride, appeared annoyed whenever 
the newlyweds managed to elude them.43  Shortly before the trial the affair 
took on even greater notes of daytime drama when the Birmingham Police 
Chief (also a Klansman) had Pedro arrested and jailed on an out-of-state 
 
 41. Id. at 211. 
 42. Id. at 146–47. 
 43. Id. at 74, 78–79. 
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murder charge that he could not have committed.44  In short, from the time of 
the shooting through the dramatic conclusion of the trial, the case possessed a 
“soap opera” quality that kept the public riveted. 
The prosecution of Reverend Edwin Stephenson also exhibited features of 
a “Worm in the Bud” trial, which Professor Friedman loosely defines as a trial 
exposing the sordid underside of a slice of a community normally considered 
respectable.45  Like many cities its size, Birmingham, Alabama, in 1921 
boasted several social strata.  Held in particularly high esteem were members 
of its clergy.  Edwin Stephenson’s status as an ordained Methodist minister, 
and the social ranking of his victim as well, helps to explain why the country 
became transfixed with the Birmingham shooting.  Newspapers in major 
metropolitan centers and national magazines like The Nation reported about 
the powerful influence that the Ku Klux Klan was exerting in Birmingham, 
even over members of the Protestant clergy, and protested the open, 
unapologetic anti-Catholic climate that had been allowed to fester there and 
elsewhere.46 
Professor Friedman’s observations about the tendency of “Tabloid Trials” 
to become headliners also appear to fit the facts of Alabama v. Edwin 
Stephenson.  For some of the same reasons as above, Reverend Edwin 
Stephenson’s crime “titillated the public” due to the unexpected nature of the 
homicide itself.  Even in 1921, when popular tabloid papers like The New 
Menace of Aurora, Missouri, and Senator Thomas Watson’s Jeffersonian of 
Atlanta spewed anti-Catholic hate from every page, the killing of an unarmed 
Catholic priest on the porch of his home by a Methodist pastor was no every 
day event.47  These papers followed the events in Birmingham closely with a 
slew of front-page articles under headlines that left nothing to the imagination 
about their view of the rightness of the minister’s act: “Ala. Priest Killed by 
Aggrieved Father, Daughter of Minister Inveigled into Romanism by Papist 
Lover and Priests,” one banner headline of The New Menace blared.48 
At the time of Reverend Edwin Stephenson’s trial in October 1921, the 
case involved no public figure with the kind of celebrity that could justify its 
description as a “Political Trial.”  Although Stephenson’s lead attorney, Hugo 
Black, would achieve national fame later in life, in 1921, Black was still 
making a name for himself in his home state.49  Nevertheless, employing 
Professor Friedman’s broader conception of a “Political Trial,” Stephenson’s 
case could easily be situated within this category as well, providing additional 
 
 44. DAVIES, supra note 1, at 189–90. 
 45. Friedman, supra note 2, at 1264. 
 46. DAVIES, supra note 1, at 86. 
 47. Id. at 14–15. 
 48. Id. at 201. 
 49. Id. at 129–31. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1324 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 55:1317 
explanation for its headliner status.  Friedman includes within this class of 
cases those that raise some important issue of public policy or principle, even 
if the parties themselves are largely unknown to the public at the time of the 
alleged crime.50  He cites as an example the prosecution of John Scopes in the 
summer of 1925, for teaching evolution in a Dayton, Tennessee public school 
in violation of a law prohibiting it.51  Like Stephenson (and even Hugo Black), 
the defendant school teacher could boast no public fame before the start of the 
case.  But the principle raised by Scope’s prosecution held the country 
spellbound as famed attorney Clarence Darrow and three-time-Presidential 
candidate William Jennings Bryant did battle in Dayton, less over the fate of 
John Scopes, than over the war between theology and modern science itself.52  
At a time when many Americans harbored anti-Catholic sentiments similar to 
Stephenson’s, the case raised important questions about how to conceive of the 
criminal defendant—as a coldblooded murder or as the community’s 
champion? 
For similar reasons, the 1921 prosecution of Reverend Edwin Stephenson 
could readily be categorized as a “Was Justice Done?  Trial”—a trial achieving 
public prominence due to concern over the difficulties the prosecutor would 
face in bringing the minister to justice in a climate of open and overt anti-
Catholicism.  At the time of Stephenson’s trial, Catholics were routinely 
accused of stockpiling weapons and ammunition in Catholic buildings in 
anticipation of the day their Roman leader, the Pope, would call for the 
insurrection to begin to “make America Catholic.”53  The trial also occurred 
during a period in which a number of states, including Alabama, had passed 
“Convent Inspection” laws.54  These laws authorized state officials to conduct 
warrantless searches of Catholic properties, such as churches, rectories, 
monasteries, convents, even Catholic-run hospitals, for persons being held 
against their will—young, naïve women like Ruth Stephenson, seduced into 
the Catholic faith, then held captive to be preyed upon by lustful priests—and 
for weapons Catholics were accused of stockpiling.55  Fears that the prosecutor 
would be unable to convict Reverend Stephenson in this climate were 
substantiated when Joe Tate wrestled for weeks simply to convince the grand 
jury to indict the minister, and when the grand jurors, finally signing a true bill, 
decided to charge Stephenson with second rather than first degree murder.56  
 
 50. See Friedman, supra note 2, at 1251 (noting that the defendant in the Scopes Monkey 
Trial was simply a high school teacher). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. DAVIES, supra note 1, at 15. 
 54. Davies, supra note 38. 
 55. Id.; see also DAVIES, supra note 1, at 15. 
 56. DAVIES, supra note 1, at 204. 
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Later, the strategy Hugo Black employed at Stephenson’s trial, including overt 
and covert attempts to exploit the most potent religious and racial prejudices of 
the day, raised questions about the ethics of the defense that would survive for 
decades to come.57 
In sum, several of Professor Friedman’s categories help us understand 
why, in its day, the trial of Reverend Edwin Stephenson captivated the nation 
making it deserving of the title “headline trial.”  Moving on, it is also possible 
to detect within Stephenson’s prosecution broader social meaning that 
Friedman tells us these trials almost always possess as well. 
III.  HEADLINE TRIALS AND SOCIAL MEANING 
In his lecture, after supplying the typology of the characteristics typically 
exhibited in headline trials, Professor Friedman reflected on the deeper social 
and historical meaning that such trials possess, including their power to 
transfer information (and misinformation) to their community of observers, 
their ability to legitimate and reproduce powerful social commitments (whether 
written or unwritten), and their tendency not simply to entertain, but to teach, 
reflecting, even molding future social attitudes and human behavior.58 
A. The Peculiar Male Duty to Kill—“Honor Killings” 
The 1921 headline trial of Alabama v. Edwin R. Stephenson possessed all 
of these deeper, longstanding social meanings.  As with all criminal trials, 
Stephenson’s prosecution carried the power to educate the public about 
existing substantive criminal prohibitions, sentences and potential defenses.  
Indeed, in order to promote law-abiding behavior, our criminal justice system 
depends on publicity surrounding criminal trials to educate the public about 
what the law requires and about how law-breaking acts will be punished.  
Because all criminal trials possess this power to edify the public, however, that 
power alone cannot explain why some trials move into public consciousness 
while most do not.  Rather, as Friedman asserts, a trial is far more likely to 
attain “headline” celebrity when it not only educates the public about the 
“written” law, like the law of homicide, but when it reveals the existence of the 
so-called “unwritten law” as well.59 
In the early decades of the twentieth century, trial lawyers plainly 
understood the reality and power of the “unwritten law,” and not just in the 
South.  Indeed, the unwritten law had won countless acquittals in jurisdictions 
across the country, most often in homicide cases like Stephenson’s, where the 
 
 57. See id. at 231 (noting Hugo Black’s inclusion of questions about witnesses’ Catholic 
faith and the insinuation of bias against Stephenson). 
 58. See Friedman, supra note 2, at 1267–83. 
 59. See id. at 1268–69 (noting a trial’s ability to shed light on social norms, such as 
“unwritten laws”). 
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positive or official “law of homicide” appeared to demand a conviction, while 
the “unwritten law,” binding one man to another, insisted on its opposite. 
Partly to avoid censure, lawyers learned to appeal to the unwritten law in 
coded language, through oblique references to the duty of a father or husband 
or brother to avenge some wrong done a wife or a daughter or a sister.  In a 
judicial system ostensibly devoted to the rule of law, such shrouded references 
were necessary, as no criminal code explicitly acknowledged the masculine 
expectations as a valid defense—that’s what made them unwritten.  
Nevertheless, lawyers and juries were plainly acquainted with them.  Indeed, 
the practice of encouraging jurors to decide whether an accused’s conduct 
aligned with their own sense of right and wrong (rather than to confine 
themselves to the narrower question of whether the defendant’s acts violated 
some specifically prescribed written law), eventually became so deeply 
familiar to men that it was given a name—the “honor defense.”60 
One of the most revealing articulations of the honor defense ever delivered 
by a lawyer during this period was that of Delphin Delmas, on behalf of 
accused murderer Harry Kendall Thaw, in a spectacular trial that took place 
near the turn of the twentieth century in New York City.61  Thaw had shot to 
death a well-known architect, Stanford White, after stewing over his (Thaw’s) 
wife’s claim that White had sexually molested her when she was younger.62 
In his closing argument to the 1907 jury, Thaw’s attorney all but conceded 
his client’s inability to satisfy the formal definition of legal insanity.63  As in 
Alabama, the defense of legal insanity in New York demanded affirmative 
proof that some diagnosable mental disease lay at the root of his client’s killing 
act.64  But Delmas’s expert witnesses had been unable to agree on a diagnosis 
that would satisfy that standard.65  To remedy the gap in his proof, Delmas 
argued boldly: “Gentlemen, I care not whether you give that insanity a name or 
not.  It is a species of insanity which . . . is perfectly familiar to every man who 
has a family, and to the history of jurisprudence in these United States.”66  
“[I]f you desire to give it a name,” the lawyer went on, “I will ask you to label 
it dementia Americana.”67  To ensure the jurors understood the nature of the 
mental disturbance he was describing, Delmas continued: 
 
 60. John T. Parry, Progress and Justification in American Criminal Law, 40 TULSA L. REV. 
639, 649–50 (2005). 
 61. See Martha Merrill Umphrey, The Dialogics of Legal Meaning: Spectacular Trials, the 
Unwritten Law, and Narratives of Criminal Responsibility, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 393, 393 
(1999) (describing Delmas’s insanity defense of “dementia americana”). 
 62. Id. at 393, 414–15. 
 63. Id. at 417. 
 64. Id. at 402. 
 65. Id. at 416. 
 66. Umphrey, supra note 61, at 417 (emphasis added). 
 67. Id. 
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It is that species of insanity which makes every home sacred.  It is that species 
of insanity which makes a man believe that the honour of his wife is sacred; it 
is that species of insanity which makes him believe that whoever invades the 
sanctity of that home, whoever brings pollution upon that daughter, whoever 
stains the virtue of that wife, has forfeited the protection of human laws and 
must look to the eternal justice and mercy of God.68 
The jury acquitted.69 
It is clear from the foregoing that, as Delmas and other lawyers of his day 
conceived it, Dementia Americana was a mental affliction that demanded no 
footing in the concrete realm of psychiatric medicine.  An official diagnosis of 
mental illness by a trained expert was entirely unnecessary; indeed, Delmas 
plainly felt capable of diagnosing it himself!  Moreover, while Delmas 
purported to assert a legal insanity defense on his client’s behalf, it seems 
evident that the condition he was describing was actually one of sanity rather 
than its opposite—a state of mind that all good men would wish to possess.  
Put slightly differently, Delmas turned his client’s purported “insanity” into a 
condition familiar to every man with a family to protect.  If this was madness, 
let all men of worth seek to suffer it. 
Finally, Delmas’s argument explicitly referenced the supposed boundaries 
of man-made law.  In theory at least, the law of homicide exists to outlaw the 
intentional killing of nonlethal aggressors.  But Delmas plainly felt empowered 
to argue that Stanford White, the victim of Thaw’s slaying, had “forfeited” the 
protection that  “human law” was designed to confer by (allegedly) sexually 
assaulting Thaw’s wife years earlier.70 
When defending Reverend Edwin Stephenson in Birmingham in 1921, 
Hugo Black and his co-counsel made several strikingly similar appeals to the 
unwritten law.  Although Stephenson entered a plea of “not guilty by reason of 
insanity,”71 a plea grounded in the suggestion that he killed Coyle while in a 
state of severe mental impairment over which he had no control, the closing 
arguments of his lawyers displayed a telling tone of moral justification for his 
actions (rather than excuse).  Far from a pathetic victim of mental illness, the 
lawyers held Stephenson out as the community’s champion—a husband and 
father, tortured for years by a religious assault “the Catholics” had waged 
against his family—a man compelled to defend his home.72  Hugo Black and 
his co-counsel muddied the waters even further with insinuations that the 
groom, Pedro Gussman, was not only Catholic (bolstering their claim that Ruth 
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 69. Id. at 419.  Thaw’s first trial resulted in a hung jury, but his second trial resulted in 
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 71. DAVIES, supra note 1, at 215. 
 72. Id. 
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was unduly influenced away from the faith of her birth) but the descendant of a 
black person as well.73  In an age of anti-miscegenation laws, where states like 
Alabama punished marriage between whites and blacks as a crime,74 this 
additional racial accusation hoped to portray Stephenson’s act of violence as 
the proper course.75 
The only hope the strategy employed in the Stephenson case had of 
succeeding, of course, was if the defense’s narrative resonated more 
powerfully with the jury than the prosecution’s narrative.  Exploiting unwritten 
but deeply entrenched gender norms, patriarchy and period prejudices, the 
plain goal of the defense was to portray the injury done to the slain victim 
(whose life the law of homicide would normally strive to vindicate) as less 
weighty than the injury the priest himself had inflicted on Edwin Stephenson 
and his household.  If such a strategy worked, it would reveal much to us today 
about the respective force of the contending interests involved: laws protecting 
human life versus norms protecting male honor, religious hierarchy, and white 
supremacy. 
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